Objectivism in Sociology
C. A. Ellwood
American Journal of Sociology
November 1913
Vol. 22, no. 3, pp. 293–300
[Summary of Zeliony 1912]
Not a few sociologists in both Europe and America have expressed the conviction that it is only by adopting such a rigidly objective method that sociology can advance as a science. But only one, so far as the writer knows, has had the courage to state clearly and explicitly — in a manner beyond criticism — all that is implied in such a program. This is Dr. G. P. Zeliony, a docent in physiology in the University of St. Petersburg (now Petrograd), who in 1909 read a paper before the philosophical society of that place in which he presented a truly objective viewpoint, and carried it without reserve to its ultimate conclusion. Zeliony wishes to apply the method of natural science to sociology. Natural science, he says, is the science of phenomena which are objects of investigation, and not of the conceptions which ordinarily accompany || Start page 294 || them. || “The writer is indebted for the summary of Zeliony’s views which follows to a former student, Mr. Arthur S. Emig. Zeliony’s original paper may be found in the Archiv für Rassen- und Gesellschafts-Biologie, IX, 405–30 [sic].” (Footnote by Ellwood, p. 294.) || Such analyses of phenomena give us results which can then be used for further investigation. The task of natural science is, first, the description of phenomena and the discovery of new ones, and secondly, the deduction of relations of law between them.
Many sociologists accept this attitude in theory, but not in practice, owing to their unclear conception of phenomena. Now a clear conception of phenomena compels the scientist in the examination of mankind, says Zeliony, to leave the psychic side untouched. For instance, a man with an angry face and a menacing attitude attacks another. We usually explain such incidents by what we see, namely, a man with an angry face and a menacing attitude. But I see only the sum-total of the outward phenomena which I have abstracted from the surrounding phenomena. The man’s face is clouded, and from the appearance I declare it to be anger. But the mind of another cannot be considered as a phenomenon, nor as a fact. The conception of consciousness cannot have a place as a scientific designation of a natural phenomenon. Consciousness must be ignored by the natural scientist, as it is not available for his observation, neither can it serve as a transcendental hypothesis.
The whole of modern sociology is full of such mistaken designations. It makes such social phenomena as “marriage,” “crime,” and “the family’’ similar to natural phenomena. But crime cannot be such a phenomenon. For instance, a man strikes a knife into the breast of another. That act can be seen with the eyes; but if we characterize this act as a “crime” we involve or build on the psychic of another person which is inaccessible or unavailable for us. Again the concept “family” requires the presentation of the psychic of individuals, and thus must also be barred from scientific sociology. Crime and the family can be made objects of scientific investigation; but the concepts should only play the rôle of drawing attention to the other facts connected with these; and, when we examine phenomena, we must abandon concepts, as they are only guides to be dispensed with when the destination is reached. || Start page 295 ||
Frequently it is granted that the mind is no phenomenon for the scientist, but it is claimed that he can take refuge in it for the explanation of certain phenomena. But such a contention also cannot be admitted. Science is founded on the principle that every overt phenomenon has a cause in another overt phenomenon; but this cause must be considered in the sense of “condition for the act.” The scientist asks “how,” “under what conditions,” and not “why.” He seeks no hidden inner cause, but only conditions or laws, according to which phenomena take place. What causes the angry man with the stick in his hand to raise his hand? In a certain sense it lies in the wish of the man to hit his opponent. But such an answer from a scientific point of view is of no avail, Zeliony says, since to explain a phenomenon signifies to designate the causal connection with other phenomena; and as the psychic of a man is unavailable for observation, the connection of it with the physical phenomena of the organism is no explanation. But when we explain the raising of the hand in connection with the physical effect on the organism, then, and only then, do we give a scientific explanation. The scientist has no right to explain human phenomena by, or take refuge in, the mind.
But it may be objected that the natural scientist does deal with psychic phenomena, and thus the method of natural science should permit the use of the psychic in the social sciences. But to such a contention Zeliony replies that this method does not deal with science itself but with the individual scientist, and thus he deals only with what is phenomenon for him, and not with that which is found in the mind of another. Thus he touches only what is physical for him. Again, it might be objected that science is based on metaphysical hypotheses, and proceeds from them. For instance, science, dealing with hypothetical atoms and electrons as a working basis, uses mind and consciousness. But when the scientist examines the physical side of the human body he gets no idea of the mind or consciousness; but through the investigations of physics and chemistry he knows that he is led to such concepts as atoms and electrons.
Zeliony insists that we must get rid of the presentation of man as a psycho-physical organism, and consider him as an organism || Start page 296 || alone, and ignore the mind entirely. But such a procedure, he admits, requires a difficult mental discipline.
The world shows many changes. Some are from natural causes, as rivers and earthquakes. Others result from living organisms. Bacteria result in changing the surrounding medium. More complex organisms produce more complex changes, as ant heaps. But the largest changes, such as cities and canals, are due to the most complex organism, namely man. From the physico-chemical view there is no difference in the result on surrounding nature of the unorganized forces, such as ice, wind, or rain, and the highly organized work of the human organism. Animals affect not only nature, but also each other. A bird’s-eye view of any nation shows us that some individuals go in one direction, others in other directions. This direction and the character of the movement depend on the surrounding people and other natural conditions. Again some require little, some much, food. Differences in race will also be noted in the care of the wounded and dead, and in the styles of clothing. These differences give the scientist his objects of investigation; and if these cannot be explained without reference to the mind, then natural science must be ignored. An organism produces no energy. The activity of every organism represents energy taken from outside of itself. This condition is true if the process goes on between two organisms, or one organism and nature, as both are under physico-chemical laws.
Again, there are two kinds of complicated relations between the animal organism and the environment. There is, first, the interaction of the organism and the environment which follows from reflection, through the intervention of the nervous system as the result of the outer world acting on the sense organs. In the second place, there is the non-reflective influence which is not entirely dependent on the nervous system. A reflex action of an organism is due to an exchange of excitation of an ingoing nerve with an outgoing nerve through the nervous system of the organism. Not only the laity, but many well-educated persons as well, insist that some acts are different, requiring something called consciousness to carry them to completion. It is not a reflex mechanism, they think, but a psychic process, such as words spoken in response to a question. || Start page 297 || These together are called “behavior.” It is perhaps true that these reactions really do have their cause in psychic processes; but for the scientist the cause lies in the mechanical processes of the nervous system — in other words, in the reflexes. Even if the mind does regulate the nervous processes, the work of the physico-sociologist is not changed, for he considers only process, and not mind.
A chief reason for the reaction against such an objective method, Zeliony thinks, is that until recently human action was supposed to follow no laws; but now the result of scientific investigation has given us the concept of conditional reflexes.
Unconditional reflexes require no previous conditions. They show themselves through being general. Certain excitations call forth in each individual a complete definite reaction, as, for instance, a sour substance in the mouth causes saliva to flow. But some excitations get certain reactions in one organism, but not in others. The breaking of toast causes saliva to flow in some dogs’ mouths, but not in others, depending on whether they have been previously fed on toast or not. The conditional reflexes thus build themselves through combinations with unconditional. Furthermore, the conditional can disappear, as when the dog, hearing the crumbling of the toast, is never fed on it, and the reflex finally dies. And again, the conditional reflex can be modified. If the dog is scratched immediately after the crumbling of the toast, he gradually fails to react in the same way toward the crumbling alone.
Most reflexes are conditional and are the basis of habits. Words spoken or written are excitations to which we react in a certain way. Human behavior can be reduced to objective terms, as most of it is reflexive. At the rattling of dishes a man goes into the dining-room. Scholars go to classes at the ringing of the bell, and soldiers at a given command react in a given way.
Now Zeliony raises the question whether or not under these conditions a scientific order in human society can be sought, or whether sociology does not become collective physiology. There is no doubt but that the changes of society are the result of the activities of the nervous system. Excitations vary with the same animal and with the same class of animals. The problem of the || Start page 298 || socio-physiologist is to find out what are the excitors and what the inhibitors. Physiology gives the laws of the nervous system, which exclude appeal to the psychic. Thus the duty of the socio-physiologist is to give a description of the nervous processes of groups which have resulted in changes in the environment. In the primitive stages of development the unchangeable reflexes play the most important part. An organism reacts on another by bodily movement, or by the voice, or otherwise. In cultured society, however, one organism affects another by means of definite excitations, such as letters, papers, telegrams, and other products of reflective activity.
Physiological sociology will also have to take into consideration natural selection, or the struggle for existence. In this consideration, however, the psychic side of the organism will not be considered as a factor directly, but only through its physical correlatives, that is, through the function of the nervous system. But such a physiological sociology will be possible only when the physiology of the nervous system and the reflexes have been satisfactorily developed. Great aid in the understanding of these reflexes will be gained through the close examination of the physiology of animals below man. With these we can use instruments and methods which cannot be used when dealing with man. And from such procedure we can make generalizations which can be used in the analysis of human activity. The knowledge of the above-mentioned conditional reflexes which has been gained by observation of the behavior of animals can also be used in the explanation of the behavior of the human organism.
Furthermore, a socio-physiological pathology will become necessary. Its field of observation will be the deviations from the norm which are observed either as a result of the pathological differences in the organism or as a result of other conditions, as in the insane or those addicted to the use of alcohol.
The special method of the physiological sociologist will develop as the science develops. One great help will be derived from the method found in the formation of conditional reflexes. The statistical method will also be found valuable, but not in the form in which it is used today. One will be required which will deal only || Start page 299 || with scientifically characterized facts. It will, furthermore, need the results of all forms of knowledge, physics, chemistry, meteorology, geology, climatology, astronomy, etc. And, says Zeliony, the object of his paper is to show, not what the sociologist should do, but what he cannot do.
Furthermore, he insists that, in considering man, we must consider him in a way in which alone such a procedure is possible, that is, physiologically. We can leave science and use the psychological side also, and by the observation of activity deduce certain things about the individual mind, and then about society. Thus we would have a collective psychology; but such a procedure is not scientific. We will leave it to the philosopher to decide what it is. What the psychic activity of the other individual shall be called, the subjective sociologist must decide. “Mind” and “consciousness” cannot explain the complicated interaction of human organisms. Thus it is difficult to be a follower of the psychological sociologist. Psychic phenomena cannot be observed in their true form, as observation itself varies, and psychic phenomena are very changeable; neither can they be measured, nor made exact. Thus we are driven to admit that physiological sociology can exist without psychological sociology, but not vice versa; according to Zeliony. As psychology has strengthened itself by connection with physiology, so psychological sociology can progress on the foundation of a physiological sociology.
No one denies that our conceptions of the psychic processes are built on the behavior of the body, and external changes. Thus it follows that our psychic activity will be better understood the better we understand the physical, and only then will psychological sociology gain a high plane of development. The subjective sociologist can avail himself of the results of objective sociology on the basis of psychic parallelism. When we get the conditions of the physical phenomena, we also get the conditions of the connected psychic phenomena. To illustrate, an officer has power over his soldiers. Subjectively the claim is mental interaction. But objectively the explanation would be that certain words call forth certain responses; others call forth inhibitors. Thus the action can be accounted for reflexively, and the psychic interactions || Start page 300 || of people have a physical correlative. We should proceed in sociology about as has been done in the study of acoustics. Auditory sensations are not measureable, and thus do not admit of exact science. The scientist, however, examined the vibrations of an elastic medium which were accompanied by auditory sensations. And as these vibrations were studied, and it was learned how to control them, control was also gained over auditory sensations. As a result acoustics have been given a solid foundation.
In conclusion, Zeliony shows the value of a physiological sociology. Science is founded on a careful analysis of facts which it takes years of time to gain, but the results are rich and irrefutable. Boats were once built without the use of physics. But when physics became a science, would it have helped any to say that it was useless because a ship could not be built at once with its principles? But when the science became systematized, it gave us the modern steamship. At present physiological sociology is valueless for social practice, as Zeliony admits, but in the future it will aid in the understanding of social interactions as easily as we now understand dead nature. Its laws will enable us to get laws of interaction.
But, regardless of its value, such a procedure gives the scientist great satisfaction. Under the monadism of Leibnitz, physiology was hemmed in by having the subjective element introduced. Pawlow especially has sought to free physiology of its subjective element, and now its only abode is in the mental interaction of individuals. When the subjective is driven from this place also, then the scientist can regard the world as a large, complicated mechanism, in which mankind represents only one part. Under such a scientific method our world-view will show that such a science is not interested in morality, nor in the value of the psychic, nor in psychic activity; and thus the basis of a practical worldview will be sought elsewhere. The practical results will be as in biology. In this field no attention was paid to the value or benefit for man, and the results have been unexpected.